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Abstract. We present the first idealized cryptographic library that can be used
like the Dolev-Yao model for automated proofs of cryptographic protocols that
use nested cryptographic operations, while coming with a cryptographic imple-
mentation that is provably secure under active attacks.
To illustrate the usefulness of the cryptographic library, we present a cryptograph-
ically sound security proof of the well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-
key protocol for entity authentication. This protocol was previously only proved
over unfounded abstractions from cryptography. We show that the protocol is se-
cure against arbitrary active attacks if it is implemented using standard provably
secure cryptographic primitives. Conducting the proof by means of the idealized
cryptographic library does not require us to deal with the probabilistic aspects of
cryptography, hence the proof is in the scope of current automated proof tools.
Besides establishing the cryptographic security of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe
protocol, this exemplifies the potential of this cryptographic library and paves the
way for the cryptographically sound verification of security protocols by auto-
mated proof tools.
1 Introduction
Many practically relevant cryptographic protocols like SSL/TLS, S/MIME, IPSec, or
SET use cryptographic primitives like signature schemes or encryption in a black-box
way, while adding many non-cryptographic features. Vulnerabilities have accompanied
the design of such protocols ever since early authentication protocols like Needham-
Schroeder [4, 5], over carefully designed de-facto standards like SSL and PKCS [6, 7],
up to current widely deployed products like Microsoft Passport [8]. However, proving
the security of such protocols has been a very unsatisfactory task for a long time.
One possibility was to take the cryptographic approach. This means reduction
proofs between the security of the overall system and the security of the cryptographic
primitives, i.e., one shows that if one could break the overall system, one could also
break one of the underlying cryptographic primitives with respect to their cryptographic
definitions, e.g., adaptive chosen-message security for signature schemes. For authenti-
cation protocols, this approach was first used in [9]. In principle, proofs in this approach
are as rigorous as typical proofs in mathematics. In practice, however, human beings are
extremely fallible with this type of proofs. This is not due to the cryptography, but to the
⋆ Parts of this work appeared in [1–3].
distributed-systems aspects of the protocols. It is well-known from non-cryptographic
distributed systems that many wrong protocols have been published even for very small
problems. Hand-made proofs are highly error-prone because following all the different
cases how actions of different machines interleave is extremely tedious. Humans tend
to take wrong shortcuts and do not want to proof-read such details in proofs by others.
If the protocol contains cryptography, this obstacle is even much worse: Already a rig-
orous definition of the goals gets more complicated, and often not only trace properties
(integrity) have to be proven but also secrecy. Further, in principle the complexity-
theoretic reduction has to be carried out across all these cases, and it is not at all trivial
to do this rigorously. In consequence, there is almost no real cryptographic proof of
a larger protocol, and several times supposedly proven, relatively small systems were
later broken, e.g., [10, 11].
The other possibility was to use formal methods. There one leaves the tedious parts
of proofs to machines, i.e., model checkers or automatic theorem provers. This means
to code the cryptographic protocols into the language of such tools, which may need
more or less start-up work depending on whether the tool already supports distributed
systems or whether interaction models have to be encoded first. None of these tools,
however, is currently able to deal with reduction proofs. Nobody even thought about
this for a long time, because one felt that protocol proofs could be based on simpler,
idealized abstractions from cryptographic primitives. Almost all these abstractions are
variants of the Dolev-Yao model [12], which represents all cryptographic primitives as
operators of a term algebra with cancellation rules. For instance, public-key encryption
is represented by operators E for encryption and D for decryption with one cancellation
rule, D(E(m)) = m for all m. Encrypting a message m twice in this model does not
yield another message from the basic message space but the term E(E(m)). Further, the
model assumes that two terms whose equality cannot be derived with the cancellation
rules are not equal, and every term that cannot be derived is completely secret. However,
originally there was no foundation at all for such assumptions about real cryptographic
primitives, and thus no guarantee that protocols proved with these tools were still secure
when implemented with real cryptography. Although no previously proved protocol has
been broken when implemented with standard provably secure cryptosystems, this was
clearly an unsatisfactory situation, and artificial counterexamples can be constructed.
1.1 A Dolev-Yao Model that is Cryptographically Sound under Active Attacks
Three years ago, efforts started to get the best of both worlds. Essentially, [13, 14]
started to define general cryptographic models that support idealization that is secure in
arbitrary environments and under arbitrary active attacks, while [15] started to justify
the Dolev-Yao model as far as one could without such a model. Both directions were
significantly extended in subsequent papers, in particular [16–22].
The conference version [1, 23] underlying this paper is the first one that offers
a provably secure variant of the Dolev-Yao model for proofs that people typically
make with the Dolev-Yao model, because for the first time we cover both active at-
tacks and nested cryptographic operations. While [1] addressed the soundness of asym-
metric cryptographic primitives such as public-key encryption and digital signatures,
subsequent papers extended the soundness result to symmetric authentication [24] and
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symmetric encryption [25]. Moreover, tailored tool support for this library was subse-
quently added [26, 27].1 Combining security against active attacks and nesting crypto-
graphic operations arbitrarily is essential: First, most cryptographic protocols are bro-
ken by active attacks, e.g., man-in-the-middle attacks or attacks where an adversary
reuses a message from one protocol step in a different protocol step where it sud-
denly gets a different semantics. Such attacks are not covered by [30, 16]. Secondly,
the main use of the Dolev-Yao model is to represent nested protocol messages like
Epkev (signsksu(m,N1), N2), where m denotes an arbitrary message and N1, N2 two
nonces. No previous idealization proved in the reactive cryptographic models contains
abstractions from cryptographic primitives (here mainly encryption and signatures, but
also the nonces and the list operation) that can be used in such nested terms. Exist-
ing abstractions are either too high-level, e.g., the secure channels in [17, 19] combine
encryption and signatures in a fixed way. Or they need immediate interaction with the
adversary [18, 31], i.e., the adversary learns the structure of every term any honest party
ever builds, and even every signed message. This abstraction is not usable for a term as
above because one may want to show that m is secret because of the outer encryption,
but the abstraction gives m to the adversary. (A similar immediate application of the
model of [17] to such primitives would avoid this problem, but instead keep all signa-
tures and ciphertexts in the system, so that nesting is also not possible.) Finally, there
exist some semi-abstractions which still depend on cryptographic details [32, 17]. Thus
they are not suitable for abstract protocol representations and proof tools, but we use
such a semi-abstraction of public-key encryption as a submodule below.
The first decision in the design of an ideal library that supports both nesting and gen-
eral active attacks was how we can represent an idealized cryptographic term and the
corresponding real message in the same way to a higher protocol. This is necessary for
using the reactive cryptographic models and their composition theorems. We do this by
handles, i.e., local names. In the ideal system, these handles essentially point to Dolev-
Yao-like terms, while in the real system they point to real cryptographic messages. Our
model for storing the terms belonging to the handles is stateful and in the ideal system
comprises the knowledge of who knows which terms. Thus our overall ideal crypto-
graphic library corresponds more to “the CSP Dolev-Yao model” or “the Strand-space
Dolev-Yao model” than the pure algebraic Dolev-Yao model. Once one has the idea of
handles, one has to consider whether one can put the exact Dolev-Yao terms under them
or how one has to or wants to deviate from them in order to allow a provably secure
cryptographic realization, based on a more or less general class of underlying primi-
tives. An overview of these deviations is given in Section 1.4, and Section 1.5 surveys
how the cryptographic primitives are augmented to give a secure implementation of the
ideal library.
The vast majority of the work was to make a credible proof that the real crypto-
graphic library securely implements the ideal one. This is a hand-made proof based
on cryptographic primitives and with many distributed-systems aspects, and thus with
1 In more recent work, drawing upon insides gained from the proof of the cryptographic library,
we showed that widely considered symbolic abstractions of hash functions and of the XOR op-
eration cannot be proven computationally sound in general, hence indicating that their current
symbolic representations might be overly simplistic [28, 29].
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all the problems mentioned above for cryptographic proofs of large protocols. Indeed
we needed a novel proof technique consisting of a probabilistic, imperfect bisimulation
with an embedded static information-flow analysis, followed by cryptographic reduc-
tions proofs for so-called error sets of traces where the bisimulation did not work. As
this proof needs to be made only once, and is intended to be the justification for later
basing many protocol proofs on the ideal cryptographic library and proving them with
higher assurance using automatic tools, we carefully worked out all the tedious de-
tails, and we encourage some readers to double-check the 68-page full version of this
paper [23] and the extension to symmetric cryptographic operations [24, 25]. Based on
our experience with making this proof and the errors we found by making it, we strongly
discourage the reader against accepting idealizations of cryptographic primitives where
a similar security property, simulatability, is claimed but only the first step of the proof,
the definition of a simulator, is made. In the following, we sketch the ideal cryptographic
library in Section 3, the concrete cryptographic realization in Section 4, and the proof
of soundness in Section 5. We restrict our attention to asymmetric cryptographic opera-
tions in this paper and refer the reader to [24, 25] for the cases of symmetric encryption
and message authentication.
1.2 An Illustrating Example – A Cryptographically Sound Proof of the
Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol
To illustrate the usefulness of the ideal cryptographic library, we investigate the well-
known Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol [4, 33], which arguably
constitutes the most prominent example demonstrating the usefulness of the formal-
methods approach after Lowe used the FDR model checker to discover a man-in-the-
middle attack against the protocol. Lowe later proposed a repaired version of the pro-
tocol [34] and used the model checker to prove that this modified protocol (henceforth
known as the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol) is secure in the Dolev-Yao model.
The original and the repaired Needham-Schroeder public-key protocols are two of the
most often investigated security protocols, e.g., [35–38]. Various new approaches and
proof tools for the analysis of security protocols were validated by rediscovering the
known flaw or proving the fixed protocol in the Dolev-Yao model.
It is well-known and easy to show that the security flaw of the original protocol
in the Dolev-Yao model can be used to mount a successful attack against any crypto-
graphic implementation of the protocol. However, all previous security proofs of the
repaired protocol are in the Dolev-Yao model, and no theorem carried these results over
to the cryptographic approach with its much more comprehensive adversary. We close
this gap, i.e., we show that the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol is secure in the cryp-
tographic approach. More precisely, we show that it is secure against arbitrary active
attacks, including arbitrary concurrent protocol runs and arbitrary manipulation of bit-
strings within polynomial time. The underlying assumption is that the Dolev-Yao-style
abstraction of public-key encryption is implemented using a chosen-ciphertext secure
public-key encryption scheme with small additions like ciphertext tagging. Chosen-
ciphertext security was introduced in [39] and formulated as IND-CCA2 in [40]. Effi-
cient encryption systems secure in this sense exist under reasonable assumptions [41].
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Our proof is built upon the ideal cryptographic library, and a composition theo-
rem for the underlying security notion implies that protocol proofs can be made using
the ideal library, and security then carries over automatically to the cryptographic re-
alization. However, because of the extension to the Dolev-Yao model, no prior formal-
methods proof carries over directly. Our paper therefore validates this approach by the
first protocol proof over the new ideal cryptographic library, and cryptographic security
follows as a corollary. Besides its value for the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, the
proof shows that in spite of the extensions and differences in presentation with respect
to prior Dolev-Yao models, a proof can be made over the new library that seems eas-
ily accessible to current automated proof tools. In particular, the proof contains neither
probabilism nor computational restrictions. In the following, we express the Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe protocol based on the ideal cryptographic library in Section 6 and 7.
We formally capture the entity authentication requirement in Section 8, and we prove
in Section 9 that entity authentication based on the ideal library implies (the crypto-
graphic definition of) entity authentication based on the concrete realization of the li-
brary. Finally, we prove the entity authentication property based on the ideal library in
Section 10.
1.3 Further Related Literature
Both the cryptographic and the idealizing approach at proving cryptographic systems
started in the early 80s. Early examples of cryptographic definitions and reduction
proofs are [42, 43]. Applied to protocols, these techniques are at their best for rela-
tively small protocols where there is still a certain interaction between cryptographic
primitives, e.g., [44, 45]. The early methods of automating proofs based on the Dolev-
Yao model are summarized in [46]. More recently, such work concentrated on using
existing general-purpose model checkers [34, 47, 48] and theorem provers [49, 50], and
on treating larger protocols, e.g., [51].
Work intended to bridge the gap between the cryptographic approach and the use
of automated tools started independently with [13, 14] and [30]. In [30], Dolev-Yao
terms, i.e., with nested operations, are considered specifically for symmetric encryption.
However, the adversary is restricted to passive eavesdropping. Consequently, it was not
necessary to define a reactive model of a system, its honest users, and an adversary,
and the security goals were all formulated as indistinguishability of terms. This was
extended in [16] from terms to more general programs, but the restriction to passive
adversaries remains, which is not realistic in most practical applications. Further, there
are no theorems about composition or property preservation from the abstract to the real
system. Several papers extended this work for specific models or specific properties. For
instance, [52] specifically considers strand spaces and information-theoretically secure
authentication only. In [53] a deduction system for information flow is based on the
same operations as in [30], still under passive attacks only.
The approach in [13, 14] was from the other end: It starts with a general reactive
system model, a general definition of cryptographically secure implementation by sim-
ulatability, and a composition theorem for this notion of secure implementation. This
work is based on definitions of secure function evaluation, i.e., the computation of one
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set of outputs from one set of inputs [54–57]; earlier extensions towards reactive sys-
tems were either without real abstraction [32] or for quite special cases [58]. The ap-
proach was extended from synchronous to asynchronous systems in [17, 18]. All the
reactive works come with more or less worked-out examples of abstractions of crypto-
graphic systems, and first tool-supported proofs were made based on such an abstrac-
tion [19, 59] using the theorem prover PVS [60]. However, even with a composition the-
orem this does not automatically give a cryptographic library in the Dolev-Yao sense,
i.e., with the possibility to nest abstract operations, as explained above. Our crypto-
graphic library overcomes these problems. It supports nested operations in the intuitive
sense; operations that are performed locally are not visible to the adversary. It is se-
cure against arbitrary active attacks, and works in the context of arbitrary surrounding
interactive protocols. This holds independently of the goals that one wants to prove
about the surrounding protocols; in particular, property preservation theorems for the
simulatability definition we use have been proved for integrity, secrecy, liveness, and
non-interference [59, 61–65].
Concurrently to [1], an extension to asymmetric encryption, but still under passive
attacks only, has been presented in [66]. The underlying masters thesis [67] considers
asymmetric encryption under active attacks, but in the random oracle model, which is it-
self an idealization of cryptography and not justifiable [68]. Laud [69] has subsequently
presented a cryptographic underpinning for a Dolev-Yao model of symmetric encryp-
tion under active attacks. His work enjoys a direct connection with a formal proof tool,
but it is specific to certain confidentiality properties, restricts the surrounding protocols
to straight-line programs in a specific language, and does not address a connection to
the remaining primitives of the Dolev-Yao model. Herzog et al. [66] and Micciancio and
Warinschi [70] have subsequently also given a cryptographic underpinning under active
attacks. Their results are narrower than that in [1] since they are specific for public-key
encryption, but consider slightly simpler real implementations; moreover, the former
relies on a stronger assumption whereas the latter severely restricts the classes of proto-
cols and protocol properties that can be analyzed using this primitive. Section 6 of [70]
further points out several possible extensions of their work which all already exist in the
earlier work of [1]. Recently, Canetti and Herzog [71] have linked ideal functionalities
for mutual authentication and key exchange protocols to corresponding representations
in a formal language. They apply their techniques to the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe pro-
tocol by considering the exchanged nonces as secret keys. Their work is restricted to
the mentioned functionalities and in contrast to the universally composable library [1]
hence does not address soundness of Dolev-Yao models in their usual generality. The
considered language does not allow loops and offers public-key encryption as the only
cryptographic operation. Moreover, their approach to define a mapping between ideal
and real traces following the ideas of [70] only captures trace-based properties (i.e., in-
tegrity properties); reasoning about secrecy properties additionally requires ad-hoc and
functionality-specific arguments.
Efforts are also under way to formulate syntactic calculi for dealing with probabil-
ism and polynomial-time considerations, in particular [72, 32, 73, 74] and, as a second
step, to encode them into proof tools. This approach can not yet handle protocols with
any degree of automation. It is complementary to the approach of proving simple deter-
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ministic abstractions of cryptography and working with those wherever cryptography is
only used in a blackbox way.
The first cryptographically sound security proofs of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe
protocol have been presented concurrently and independently in [2] and [75]. While the
first paper conducts the proof by means of the ideal cryptographic library and hence
within a deterministic framework that is accessible for machine-assisted verification,
the proof in the second paper is done from scratch in the cryptographic approach and is
hence vulnerable to the aforementioned problems. On the other hand, the second paper
proves stronger properties; we discuss this in Section 8. It further shows that chosen-
plaintext-secure encryption is insufficient for the security of the protocol. While cer-
tainly no full Dolev-Yao model would be needed to model just the Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe protocol, there was no prior attempt to prove this or a similar cryptographic pro-
tocol based on a sound abstraction from cryptography in a way accessible to automated
proof tools. After the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol was soundly analyzed, a vari-
ety of additional protocols were proven to be secure in a computationally sound manner,
e.g., [76–80]
1.4 Overview of the Ideal Cryptographic Library
The ideal cryptographic library offers its users abstract cryptographic operations, such
as commands to encrypt or decrypt a message, to make or test a signature, and to gen-
erate a nonce. All these commands have a simple, deterministic semantics. In a reactive
scenario, this semantics is based on state, e.g., of who already knows which terms. We
store state in a “database”. Each entry has a type, e.g., “signature”, and pointers to its
arguments, e.g., a key and a message. This corresponds to the top level of a Dolev-
Yao term; an entire term can be found by following the pointers. Further, each entry
contains handles for those participants who already know it. Thus the database index
and these handles serve as an infinite, but efficiently constructible supply of global and
local names for cryptographic objects. However, most libraries have export operations
and leave message transport to their users (“token-based”). An actual implementation
of the simulatable library might internally also be structured like this, but higher proto-
cols are only automatically secure if they do not use this export function except via the
special send operations.
The ideal cryptographic library does not allow cheating. For instance, if it receives a
command to encrypt a message m with a certain key, it simply makes an abstract entry
in a database for the ciphertext. Each entry further contains handles for those partici-
pants who already know it. Another user can only ask for decryption of this ciphertext
if he has handles to both the ciphertext and the secret key. Similarly, if a user issues a
command to sign a message, the ideal system looks up whether this user should have
the secret key. If yes, it stores that this message has been signed with this key. Later
tests are simply look-ups in this database. A send operation makes an entry known to
other participants, i.e., it adds handles to the entry. Recall that our ideal library is an
entire reactive system and therefore contains an abstract network model. We offer three
types of send commands, corresponding to three channel types {s, r, i}, meaning se-
cure, authentic (but not private), and insecure. The types could be extended. Currently,
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our library contains public-key encryption and signatures, nonces, lists, and applica-
tion data. We have subsequently added symmetric authentication [24] and symmetric
encryption [25]).
The main differences between our ideal cryptographic library and the standard
Dolev-Yao model are the following. Some of them already exist in prior extensions
of the Dolev-Yao model.
– Signature schemes are not “inverses” of encryption schemes.
– Secure encryption schemes are necessarily probabilistic, and so are most secure
signature schemes. Hence if the same message is signed or encrypted several times,
we distinguish the versions by making different database entries.
– Secure signature schemes often have memory. The standard definition [43] does
not even exclude that one signature divulges the entire history of messages signed
before. We have to restrict this definition, but we allow a signature to divulge the
number of previously signed messages, so that we include the most efficient prov-
ably secure schemes under classical assumptions like the hardness of factoring [43,
81, 82].2
– We cannot (easily) allow participants to send secret keys over the network because
then the simulation is not always possible.3 Fortunately, for public-key cryptosys-
tems this is not needed in typical protocols.
– Encryption schemes cannot keep the length of arbitrary cleartexts entirely secret.
Typically one can even see the length quite precisely because message expansion
is minimized. Hence we also allow this in the ideal system. A fixed-length version
would be an easy addition to the library, or can be implemented on top of the library
by padding to a fixed length.
– Adversaries may include incorrect messages in encrypted parts of a message which
the current recipient cannot decrypt, but may possibly forward to another recipient
who can, and will thus notice the incorrect format. Hence we also allow certain
“garbage” terms in the ideal system.
1.5 Overview of the Real Cryptographic Library
The real cryptographic library offers its users the same commands as the ideal one, i.e.,
honest users operate on cryptographic objects via handles. This is quite close to standard
APIs for existing implementations of cryptographic libraries that include key storage.
The database of the real system contains real cryptographic keys, ciphertexts, etc., and
the commands are implemented by real cryptographic algorithms. Sending a term on an
insecure channel releases the actual bitstring to the adversary, who can do with it what
he likes. The adversary can also insert arbitrary bitstrings on non-authentic channels.
The simulatability proof will show that nevertheless, everything a real adversary can
achieve can also be achieved by an adversary in the ideal system, or otherwise the
underlying cryptography can be broken.
2 Memory-less schemes exist with either lower efficiency or based on stronger assumptions (e.g.,
[83–85]). We could add them to the library as an additional primitive.
3 The primitives become “committing”. This is well-known from individual simulation proofs.
It also explains why [30] is restricted to passive attacks.
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We base the implementation of the commands on arbitrary secure encryption and
signature systems according to standard cryptographic definitions. However, we “ide-
alize” the cryptographic objects and operations by measures similar to robust protocol
design [86].
– All objects are tagged with a type field so that, e.g., signatures cannot also be ac-
ceptable ciphertexts or keys.
– Several objects are also tagged with their parameters, e.g., signatures with the pub-
lic key used.
– Randomized operations are randomized completely. For instance, as the ideal sys-
tem represents several signatures under the same message with the same key as dif-
ferent, the real system has to guarantee that they will be different, except for small
error probabilities. Even probabilistic encryptions are randomized additionally be-
cause they are not always sufficiently random for keys chosen by the adversary.
The reason to tag signatures with the public key needed to verify them is that the
usual definition of a secure signature scheme does not exclude “signature stealing:” Let
(sksh , pksh) denote the key pair of a correct participant. With ordinary signatures an
adversary might be able to compute a valid key pair (sksa , pksa ) such that signatures
that pass the test with pksh also pass the test with pksa . Thus, if a correct participant re-
ceives an encrypted signature on m, it might accept m as being signed by the adversary,
although the adversary never saw m. It is easy to see that this would result in protocols
that could not be simulated. Our modification prevents this anomaly.
For the additional randomization of signatures, we include a random string r in the
message to be signed. Alternatively we could replace r by a counter, and if a signature
scheme is strongly randomized already we could omit r. Ciphertexts are randomized by
including the same random string r in the message to be encrypted and in the ciphertext.
The outer r prevents collisions among ciphertexts from honest participants, the inner r
ensures continued non-malleability.
2 Preliminary Definitions
We briefly sketch the definitions from [17]. A system consists of several possible struc-
tures. A structure consists of a set Mˆ of connected correct machines and a subset S of
free ports, called specified ports. A machine is a probabilistic IO automaton (extended
finite-state machine) in a slightly refined model to allow complexity considerations. For
these machines Turing-machine realizations are defined, and the complexity of those is
measured in terms of a common security parameter k, given as the initial work-tape
content of every machine. Readers only interested in using the ideal cryptographic li-
brary in larger protocols only need normal, deterministic IO automata.
In a standard real cryptographic system, the structures are derived from one in-
tended structure and a trust model consisting of an access structure ACC and a channel
model χ. Here ACC contains the possible sets H of indices of uncorrupted machines
among the intended ones, and χ designates whether each channel is secure, authentic
(but not private) or insecure. In a typical ideal system, each structure contains only one
machine TH called trusted host.
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Each structure is complemented to a configuration by an arbitrary user machine H
and adversary machine A. H connects only to ports in S and A to the rest, and they may
interact. The set of configurations of a system Sys is called Conf(Sys). The general
scheduling model in [17] gives each connection c (from an output port c! to an input
port c?) a buffer, and the machine with the corresponding clock port c⊳! can schedule a
message there when it makes a transition. In real asynchronous cryptographic systems,
network connections are typically scheduled byA. A configuration is a runnable system,
i.e., for each k one gets a well-defined probability space of runs. The view of a machine
in a run is the restriction to all in- and outputs this machine sees and its internal states.
Formally, the view view conf (M) of a machine M in a configuration conf is a family of
random variables with one element for each security parameter value k.
2.1 Simulatability
Simulatability is the cryptographic notion of secure implementation. For reactive sys-
tems, it means that whatever might happen to an honest user in a real system Sys real
can also happen in the given ideal system Sys id: For every structure (Mˆ1, S ) ∈ Sys real,
every polynomial-time user H, and every polynomial-time adversary A1, there exists
a polynomial-time adversary A2 on a corresponding ideal structure (Mˆ2, S ) ∈ Sys id
such that the view of H is computationally indistinguishable in the two configurations.
This is illustrated in Figure 1. Indistinguishability is a well-known cryptographic notion
from [87].
Definition 1. (Computational Indistinguishability) Two families (vark)k∈N and
(var′k)k∈N of random variables on common domains Dk are computationally indis-
tinguishable (“≈”) iff for every algorithm Dis (the distinguisher) that is probabilistic
polynomial-time in its first input,
|P (Dis(1k, vark) = 1)− P (Dis(1
k, var′k) = 1)| ∈ NEGL,
where NEGL denotes the set of all negligible functions, i.e., g : N→ R≥0 ∈ NEGL iff
for all positive polynomials Q, ∃k0∀k ≥ k0 : g(k) ≤ 1/Q(k). ✸
Intuitively, given the security parameter and an element chosen according to either vark
or var′k, Dis tries to guess which distribution the element came from.
Definition 2. (Simulatability) Let systems Sys real and Sys id be given. We say Sys real ≥
Sys id (at least as secure as) iff for every polynomial-time configuration conf 1 = (Mˆ1, S ,
H,A1) ∈ Conf(Sys real), there exists a polynomial-time configuration conf 2 = (Mˆ2, S ,
H,A2) ∈ Conf(Sys id) (with the same H) such that view conf 1(H) ≈ view conf 2(H). ✸
For the cryptographic library, we even show blackbox simulatability, i.e., A2 consists of
a simulator Sim that depends only on (Mˆ1, S ) and uses A1 as a blackbox submachine.
An essential feature of this definition of simulatability is a composition theorem [17],
which essentially says that one can design and prove a larger system based on the ideal
system Sys id, and then securely replace Sys id by the real system Sys real.
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Fig. 1. Simulatability: The two views of H must be indistinguishable.
2.2 Notation
We write “:=” for deterministic and “←” for probabilistic assignment, and “ R←” for
uniform random choice from a set. By x := y++ for integer variables x, y we mean
y := y + 1;x := y. The length of a message m is denoted as len(m), and ↓ is an
error element available as an addition to the domains and ranges of all functions and
algorithms. The list operation is denoted as l := (x1, . . . , xj), and the arguments are
unambiguously retrievable as l[i], with l[i] = ↓ if i > j. A database D is a set of
functions, called entries, each over a finite domain called attributes. For an entry x ∈ D,
the value at an attribute att is written x.att . For a predicate pred involving attributes,
D[pred ] means the subset of entries whose attributes fulfill pred . If D[pred ] contains
only one element, we use the same notation for this element. Adding an entry x to D is
abbreviated D :⇐ x.
3 Ideal Cryptographic Library
The ideal cryptographic library consists of a trusted host THH for every subset H of a
set {1, . . . , n} of users. It has a port inu? for inputs from and a port outu ! for outputs to
each user u ∈ H and for u = a, denoting the adversary.
As mentioned in Section 1.4, we do not assume encryption systems to hide the
length of the message. Furthermore, higher protocols may need to know the length of
certain terms even for honest participants. Thus the trusted host is parameterized with
certain length functions denoting the length of a corresponding value in the real system.
The tuple of these functions is contained in a system parameter L.
For simulatability by a polynomial-time real system, the ideal cryptographic library
has to be polynomial-time. It therefore contains explicit bounds on the message lengths,
the number of signatures per key, and the number of accepted inputs at each port. They
are also contained in the system parameter L. The underlying IO automata model guar-
antees that a machine can enforce such bounds without additional Turing steps even if
an adversary tries to send more data. For all details, we refer to [23].
3.1 States
The main data structure of THH is a database D. The entries of D are abstract repre-
sentations of the data produced during a system run, together with the information on
who knows these data. Each entry x ∈ D is of the form
(ind , type, arg , hndu1 , . . . , hndum , hnda, len)
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where H = {u1, . . . , um} and:
– ind ∈ N0 is called the index of x. We write D[i] instead of D[ind = i].
– type ∈ typeset := {data, list, nonce, ske, pke, enc, sks, pks, sig, garbage} identi-
fies the type of x. Future extensions of the library can extend this set.
– arg = (a1, a2, . . . , aj) is a possibly empty list of arguments.
– hndu ∈ N0 ∪ {↓} for u ∈ H ∪ {a} identifies how u knows this entry. The value a
represents the adversary, and hndu = ↓ indicates that u does not know this entry. A
value hndu 6= ↓ is called the handle for u to entry x. We always use a superscript
“hnd” for handles and usually denote a handle to an entry D[i] by ihnd.
– len ∈ N0 denotes the length of the abstract entry. It is computed by THH using the
given length functions from the system parameter L.
Initially, D is empty. THH keeps a variable size denoting the current number of el-
ements in D. New entries x always receive the index ind := size++, and x.ind is
never changed. For each u ∈ H ∪ {a}, THH maintains a counter curhndu (cur-
rent handle) over N0 initialized with 0, and each new handle for u will be chosen as
ihnd := curhndu++.
3.2 Inputs and their Evaluation
Each input c at a port inu? with u ∈ H ∪ {a} should be a list (cmd , x1, . . . , xj). We
usually write it y ← cmd(x1, . . . , xj) with a variable y designating the result that THH
returns at outu !. The value cmd should be a command string, contained in one of the
following four command sets. Commands in the first two sets are available for both the
user and the adversary, while the last two sets model special adversary capabilities and
are only accepted for u = a. The command sets can be enlarged by future extensions of
the library.
Basic Commands First, we have a set basic cmds of basic commands. Each basic
command represents one cryptographic operation; arbitrary terms similar to the Dolev-
Yao model are built up or decomposed by a sequence of commands. For instance there
is a command gen nonce to create a nonce, encrypt to encrypt a message, and list to
combine several messages into a list. Moreover, there are commands store and retrieve
to store real-world messages (bitstrings) in the library and to retrieve them by a handle.
Thus other commands can assume that everything is addressed by handles. We only
allow lists to be signed and transferred, because the list-operation is a convenient place
to concentrate all verifications that no secret items are put into messages. Altogether,
we have
basic cmds := {get type, get len, store, retrieve, list, list proj, gen nonce,
gen sig keypair, sign, verify, pk of sig,msg of sig, gen enc keypair, encrypt, decrypt,
pk of enc}.
The commands not yet mentioned have the following meaning: get type and get len
retrieve the type and abstract length of a message; list proj retrieves a handle to the
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i-th element of a list; gen sig keypair and gen enc keypair generate key pairs for sig-
natures and encryption, respectively, initially with handles for only the user u who in-
put the command; sign, verify, and decrypt have the obvious purpose, and pk of sig,
msg of sig; and pk of enc retrieve a public key or message, respectively, from a sig-
nature or ciphertext. (Retrieving public keys will be possible in the real cryptographic
library because we tag signatures and ciphertexts with public keys as explained above.)
We only present the details of how THH evaluates such basic commands based
on its abstract state for two examples, nonce generation and encryption; see the full
version [23] for the complete definition. We assume that the command is entered at a
port inu? with u ∈ H ∪ {a}. Basic commands are local, i.e., they produce a result
at port outu ! and possibly update the database D, but do not produce outputs at other
ports. They also do not touch handles for participants v 6= u. The functions nonce len∗,
enc len∗, and max len are length functions and the message-length bound from the
system parameter L.
For nonces, THH just creates a new entry with type nonce, no arguments, a handle
for user u, and the abstract nonce length. This models that in the real system nonces
are randomly chosen bitstrings of a certain length, which should be all different and not
guessable by anyone else than u initially. It outputs the handle to u.
– Nonce Generation: nhnd ← gen nonce().
Set nhnd := curhndu++ and
D :⇐ (ind := size++, type := nonce, arg := (),
hndu := n
hnd, len := nonce len∗(k)).
The inputs for public-key encryption are handles to the public key and the plaintext
list. THH verifies the types (recall the notation D[pred ]) and verifies that the ciphertext
will not exceed the maximum length. If everything is ok, it makes a new entry of type
enc, with the indices of the public key and the plaintext as arguments, a handle for user
u, and the computed length. The fact that each such entry is new models probabilistic
encryption, and the arguments model the highest layer of the corresponding Dolev-Yao
term.
– Public-Key Encryption: chnd ← encrypt(pkhnd, lhnd).
Let pk := D[hndu = pkhnd ∧ type = pke].ind and l := D[hndu = lhnd ∧ type =
list].ind and length := enc len∗(k,D[l].len). If length > max len(k) or pk = ↓
or l = ↓, then return ↓. Else set chnd := curhndu++ and
D :⇐ (ind := size++, type := enc, arg := (pk , l),
hndu := c
hnd, len := length).
Honest Send Commands Secondly, we have a set send cmds := {send s, send r,
send i} of honest send commands for sending messages on channels of different degrees
of security. As an example we present the details of the most important case, insecure
channels.
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– send i(v, lhnd), for v ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Let l ind := D[hndu = lhnd ∧ type = list].ind . If l ind 6= ↓, output
(u, v, i, ind2hnda(l
ind)) at outa!.
The used algorithm ind2hndu retrieves the handle for user u to the entry with the
given index if there is one, otherwise it assigns a new such handle as curhndu++. Thus
this command means that the database D now stores that this message is known to the
adversary, and that the adversary learns by the output that user u wanted to send this
message to user v.
Most protocols should only use the other two send commands, i.e., secret or au-
thentic channels, for key distribution at the beginning. As the channel type is part of
the send-command name, syntactic checks can ensure that a protocol designed with the
ideal cryptographic library fulfills such requirements.
Local Adversary Commands Thirdly, we have a set adv local cmds :=
{adv garbage, adv invalid ciph, adv transform sig, adv parse} of local adversary
commands. They model tolerable imperfections of the real system, i.e., actions that
may be possible in real systems but that are not required. First, an adversary may cre-
ate invalid entries of a certain length; they obtain the type garbage. Secondly, invalid
ciphertexts are a special case because participants not knowing the secret key can rea-
sonably ask for their type and query their public key, hence they cannot be of type
garbage. Thirdly, the security definition of signature schemes does not exclude that the
adversary transforms signatures by honest participants into other valid signatures on
the same message with the same public key. Finally, we allow the adversary to retrieve
all information that we do not explicitly require to be hidden, which is denoted by a
command adv parse. This command returns the type and usually all the abstract argu-
ments of a value (with indices replaced by handles), e.g., parsing a signature yields the
public key for testing this signature, the signed message, and the value of the signature
counter used for this message. Only for ciphertexts where the adversary does not know
the secret key, parsing only returns the length of the cleartext instead of the cleartext
itself.
Adversary Send Commands Fourthly, we have a set adv send cmds :=
{adv send s, adv send r, adv send i} of adversary send commands, again modeling
different degrees of security of the channels used. In contrast to honest send commands,
the sender of a message is an additional input parameter. Thus for insecure channels the
adversary can pretend that a message is sent by an arbitrary honest user.
3.3 A Small Example
Assume that a cryptographic protocol has to perform the step
u→ v : encpkev (signsksu(m,N1), N2),
where m is an input message and N1, N2 are two fresh nonces. Given our library, this is
represented by the following sequence of commands input at port inu?. We assume that
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u has already received a handle pkehndv to the public encryption key of v, and created
signature keys, which gave him a handle skshndu .
1. mhnd ← store(m).
2. Nhnd1 ← gen nonce().
3. lhnd1 ← list(mhnd, Nhnd1 ).
4. sighnd ← sign(skshndu , lhnd1 ).
5. Nhnd2 ← gen nonce().
6. lhnd2 ← list(sighnd, Nhnd2 ).
7. enchnd ← encrypt(pkehndv , lhnd2 ).
8. mhnd ← list(enchnd).
9. send i(v,mhnd)
Note that the entire term is constructed by a local interaction of user u and the ideal
library, i.e., the adversary does not learn anything about this interaction until Step 8. In
Step 9, the adversary gets an output (u, v, i,mhnda ) with a handle mhnda for him to the re-
sulting entry. In the real system described below, the sequence of inputs for constructing
and sending this term is identical, but real cryptographic operations are used to build up
a bitstring m until Step 8, and m is sent to v via a real insecure channel in Step 9.
4 Real Cryptographic Library
The real system is parameterized by a digital signature scheme S and a public-key en-
cryption scheme E . The ranges of all functions are {0, 1}+∪{↓}. The signature scheme
has to be secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks [43].
This is the accepted security definition for general-purpose signing. The encryption
scheme has to fulfill that two equal-length messages are indistinguishable even in adap-
tive chosen-ciphertext attacks. Chosen-ciphertext security has been introduced in [39]
and formalized as “IND-CCA2” in [40]. It is the accepted definition for general-purpose
encryption. An efficient encryption system secure in this sense is [41]. Just like the ideal
system, the real system is parameterized by a tuple L′ of length functions and bounds.
4.1 Structures
The intended structure of the real cryptographic library consists of n machines
{M1, . . . ,Mn}. Each Mu has ports inu? and outu !, so that the same honest users can
connect to the ideal and the real library. Each Mu has three connections netu,v,x to each
Mv for x ∈ {s, r, i}. They are called network connections and the corresponding ports
network ports. Network connections are scheduled by the adversary.
The actual system is a standard cryptographic system as defined in [17] and sketched
in Section 2. Any subset of the machines may be corrupted, i.e., any setH ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
can denote the indices of correct machines. The channel model means that in an actual
structure, an honest intended recipient gets all messages output at network ports of type
s (secret) and a (authentic) and the adversary gets all messages output at ports of type a
and i (insecure). Furthermore, the adversary makes all inputs to a network port of type
i. This is shown in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Connections from a correct machine to another in the real system.
4.2 States of a Machine
The main data structure of Mu is a database Du that contains implementation-specific
data such as ciphertexts and signatures produced during a system run, together with
the handles for u and the type as in the ideal system, and possibly additional internal
attributes. Thus each entry x ∈ Du is of the form
(hndu ,word , type, add arg).
– hndu ∈ N0 is the handle of x and consecutively numbers all entries in Du.
– word ∈ {0, 1}+, called word, is the real cryptographic representation of x.
– type ∈ typeset ∪ {null} is the type of x, where null denotes that the entry has not
yet been parsed.
– add arg is a list of additional arguments. Typically it is (), only for signing keys it
contains the signature counter.
Similar to the ideal system, Mu maintains a counter curhndu over N0 denoting the
current number of elements in Du. New entries x always receive hndu := curhndu++,
and x.hndu is never changed.
4.3 Inputs and their Evaluation
Now we describe how Mu evaluates individual inputs. Inputs at port inu? should be
basic commands and honest send commands as in the ideal system, while network in-
puts can be arbitrary bitstrings. Often a bitstrings has to be parsed. This is captured by
a functional algorithm parse, which outputs a pair (type, arg) of a type ∈typeset and a
list of real arguments, i.e., of bitstrings. This corresponds to the top level of a term, sim-
ilar to the abstract arguments in the ideal database D. By “parse mhnd” we abbreviate
that Mu calls (type, arg)← parse(Du[mhnd].word), assigns Du[mhnd].type := type if
it was still null, and may then use arg .
Basic Commands Basic commands are again local, i.e., they do not produce outputs at
network ports. The basic commands are implemented by the underlying cryptographic
operations with the modifications motivated in Section 1.5. For general unambiguous-
ness, not only all cryptographic objects are tagged, but also data and lists. Similar to
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the ideal system, we only show two examples of the evaluation of basic commands, and
additionally how ciphertexts are parsed. All other commands can be found in the full
version [23].
In nonce generation, a real nonce n is generated by tagging a random bitstring n′
of a given length with its type nonce. Further, a new handle for u is assigned and the
handle, the word n, and the type are stored without additional arguments.
– Nonce Generation: nhnd ← gen nonce().
Let n′ R← {0, 1}nonce len(k), n := (nonce, n′), nhnd := curhndu++ and Du :⇐
(nhnd, n, nonce, ()).
For the encryption command, let Epk (m) denote probabilistic encryption of a string
mwith the public key pk in the underlying encryption system E . The parameters are first
parsed in case they have been received over the network, and their types are verified.
Then the second component of the (tagged) public-key word is the actual public key
pk , while the message l is used as it is. Further, a fresh random value r is generated for
additional randomization as explained in Section 1.5.
Recall that r has to be included both inside the encryption and in the final tagged
ciphertext c∗.
– Encryption: chnd ← encrypt(pkhnd, lhnd).
Parse pkhnd and lhnd. If Du[pkhnd].type 6= pke or Du[lhnd].type 6= list, return ↓.
Else set pk := Du[pkhnd].word [2], l := Du[lhnd].word , r R← {0, 1}nonce len(k),
encrypt c ← Epk ((r, l)), and set c∗ := (enc, pk , c, r). If c∗ = ↓ or
len(c∗) > max len(k) then return ↓, else set chnd := curhndu++ and Du :⇐
(chnd, c∗, enc, ()).
Parsing a ciphertext verifies that the components and lengths are as in c∗ above, and
outputs the corresponding tagged public key, whereas the message is only retrieved by
a decryption command.
Send Commands and Network Inputs Send commands simply output real messages
at the appropriate network ports. We show this for an insecure channel.
– send i(v, lhnd) for v ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Parse lhnd if necessary. If Du[lhnd].type = list, output Du[lhnd].word at port
netu,v ,i!.
Upon receiving a bitstring l at a network port netw,u,x?, machine Mu parses it and
verifies that it is a list. If yes, and if l is new, Mu stores it in Du using a new handle lhnd,
else it retrieves the existing handle lhnd. Then it outputs (w, x, lhnd) at port outu !.
5 Security Proof
The security claim is that the real cryptographic library is as secure as the ideal cryp-
tographic library, so that protocols proved on the basis of the deterministic, Dolev-
Yao-like ideal library can be safely implemented with the real cryptographic library.
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To formulate the theorem, we need additional notation: Let Syscry,idn,L denote the ideal
cryptographic library for n participants and with length functions and bounds L, and
Sys
cry,real
n,S,E,L′ the real cryptographic library for n participants, based on a secure signa-
ture scheme S and a secure encryption scheme E , and with length functions and bounds
L′. Let RPar be the set of valid parameter tuples for the real system, consisting of
the number n ∈ N of participants, secure signature and encryption schemes S and E ,
and length functions and bounds L′. For (n,S, E , L′) ∈ RPar , let Syscry,realn,S,E,L′ be the
resulting real cryptographic library. Further, let the corresponding length functions and
bounds of the ideal system be formalized by a function L := R2Ipar(S, E , L′), and let
Sys
cry,id
n,L be the ideal cryptographic library with parameters n and L. Using the notation
of Definition 2, we then have
Theorem 1. (Security of Cryptographic Library) For all parameters (n,S, E , L′) ∈
RPar , we have
Sys
cry,real
n,S,E,L′ ≥ Sys
cry,id
n,L ,
where L := R2Ipar(S, E , L′). ✷
For proving this theorem, we define a simulator SimH such that even the combina-
tion of arbitrary polynomial-time users H and an arbitrary polynomial-time adversary
A cannot distinguish the combination of the real machines Mu from the combination
THH and SimH (for all sets H indicating the correct machines). We first sketch the
simulator and then the proof of correct simulation.
5.1 Simulator
Basically SimH has to translate real messages from the real adversary A into handles
as THH expects them at its adversary input port ina? and vice versa; see Figure 3. In
both directions, SimH has to parse an incoming messages completely because it can
only construct the other version (abstract or real) bottom-up. This is done by recursive
algorithms. In some cases, the simulator cannot produce any corresponding message.
We collect these cases in so-called error sets and show later that they cannot occur at
all or only with negligible probability.
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Fig. 3. Ports and in- and output types of the simulator.
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The state of SimH mainly consists of a databaseDa, similar to the databasesDu , but
storing the knowledge of the adversary. The behavior of SimH is sketched as follows.
– Inputs from THH. Assume that SimH receives an input (u, v, x, lhnd) from THH.
If a bitstring l for lhnd already exists in Da, i.e., this message is already known to
the adversary, the simulator immediately outputs l at port netu,v ,x !. Otherwise, it
first constructs such a bitstring l with a recursive algorithm id2real. This algorithm
decomposes the abstract term using basic commands and the adversary command
adv parse. At the same time, id2real builds up a corresponding real bitstring using
real cryptographic operations and enters all new message parts into Da to recognize
them when they are reused, both by THH and by A.
Mostly, the simulator can construct subterms exactly like the correct machines
would do in the real system. Only for encryptions with a public key of a correct
machine, adv parse does not yield the plaintext; thus there the simulator encrypts
a fixed message of equal length. This simulation presupposes that all new message
parts are of the standard formats, not those resulting from local adversary com-
mands; this is proven correct in the bisimulation.
– Inputs from A. Now assume that SimH receives a bitstring l from A at a port
netu,v ,x?. If l is not a valid list, SimH aborts the transition. Otherwise it trans-
lates l into a corresponding handle lhnd by an algorithm real2id, and outputs the
abstract sending command adv send x(w, u, lhnd) at port ina!.
If a handle lhnd for l already exists in Da, then real2id reuses that. Otherwise it
recursively parses a real bitstring using the functional parsing algorithm. At the
same time, it builds up a corresponding abstract term in the database of THH. This
finally yields the handle lhnd. Furthermore, real2id enters all new subterms into
Da. For building up the abstract term, real2id makes extensive use of the special
capabilities of the adversary modeled in THH. In the real system, the bitstring may,
e.g., contain a transformed signature, i.e., a new signature for a message for which
the correct user has already created another signature. Such a transformation of a
signature is not excluded by the definition of secure signature schemes, hence it
might occur in the real system. Therefore the simulator also has to be able to insert
such a transformed signature into the database of THH, which explains the need for
the command adv transform signature. Similarly, the adversary might send invalid
ciphertexts or simply bitstrings that do not yield a valid type when being parsed.
All these cases can be covered by using the special capabilities.
The only case for which no command exists is a forged signature under a new
message. This leads the simulator to abort. (Such runs fall into an error set which
is later shown to be negligible.)
As all the commands used by id2real and real2id are local, these algorithms give
uninterrupted dialogues between SimH and THH, which do not show up in the views
of A and H.
Two important properties have to be shown about the simulator before the bisim-
ulation. First, the simulator has to be polynomial-time. Otherwise, the joint machine
SimH(A) of SimH and A might not be a valid polynomial-time adversary on the ideal
system. Secondly, it has to be shown that the interaction between THH and SimH in the
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recursive algorithms cannot fail because one of the machines reaches its runtime bound.
The proof of both properties is quite involved, using an analysis of possible recursion
depths depending on the number of existing handles (see [23]).
5.2 Proof of Correct Simulation
Given the simulator, we show that arbitrary polynomial-time users H and an arbi-
trary polynomial-time adversary A cannot distinguish the combination of the real ma-
chine Mu from the combination of THH and SimH. The standard technique in non-
cryptographic distributed systems for rigorously proving that two systems have identical
visible behaviors is a bisimulation, i.e., one defines a mapping between the respective
states and shows that identical inputs in mapped states retain the mapping and produce
identical outputs. We need a probabilistic bisimulation because the real system and the
simulator are probabilistic, i.e., identical inputs should yield mapped states with the
correct probabilities and identically distributed outputs. (For the former, we indeed use
mappings, not arbitrary relations for the bisimulation.) In the presence of cryptography
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and active attacks however, a normal probabilistic bisimulation is still insufficient for
three crucial reasons. First, the adversary might succeed in attacking the real system
with a very small probability, while this is impossible in the ideal system. This means
that we have to cope with error probabilities. Secondly, encryption only gives compu-
tational indistinguishability, which cannot be captured by a bisimulation, because the
actual values in the two systems may be quite different. Thirdly, the adversary might
guess a random value, e.g., a nonce that has already been created by some machine but
that the adversary has ideally not yet seen. (Formally, “ideally not yet seen” just means
that the bisimulation fails if the adversary sends a certain value which already exists
in the databases but for which there is no command to give the adversary a handle.) In
order to perform a rigorous reduction proof in this case, we have to show that no partial
information about this value has already leaked to the adversary because the value was
contained in a nested term, or because certain operations would leak partial informa-
tion. For instance, here the proof would fail if we allowed arbitrary signatures according
to the definition of [43], which might divulge previously signed messages, or if we did
not additionally randomize probabilistic ciphertexts made with keys of the adversary.
We meet these challenges by first factoring out the computational aspects by a spe-
cial treatment of ciphertexts. Then we use a new bisimulation technique that includes
a static information-flow analysis, and is followed by the remaining cryptographic re-
ductions. The rigorous proof takes 30 pages [23]; hence we can only give a very brief
overview here, see also Figure 4.
– Introducing encryption machines. We use the two encryption machines EncH and
Encsim,H from [17] to handle the encryption and decryption needs of the system.
Roughly, the first machine calculates the correct encryption of every message m,
whereas the second one always encrypts the fixed message msim len(m) and an-
swers decryption requests for the resulting ciphertexts by table look-up. By [17],
EncH is at least as secure as Encsim,H. We rewrite the machines Mu such that they
use EncH (Step 1 in Figure 4); this yields modified machines M′u. We then replace
EncH by its idealized counterpart Encsim,H (Step 2 in Figure 4) and use the compo-
sition theorem to show that the original system is at least as secure as the resulting
system.
– Combined system. We now want to compare the combination MH of the machines
M′u and Encsim,H with the combination THSimH of the machines THH and SimH.
However, there is no direct invariant mapping between the states of these two joint
machines. Hence we defining an intermediate system CˆH with a state space com-
bined from both these systems (Step 3 in Figure 4).
– Bisimulations with error sets and information-flow analysis. We show that the joint
view of H and A is equal in interaction with the combined machine CˆH and the two
machines THSimH and MH, except for certain runs, which we collect in error sets.
We show this by performing two bisimulations simultaneously (Step 4 in Figure 4).
Transitivity and symmetry of indistinguishability then yield the desired result for
THSimH and MH. Besides several normal state invariants of CˆH, we also define
and prove an information-flow invariant on the variables of CˆH.
– Reduction proofs. We show that the aggregated probability of the runs in error sets
is negligible, as we could otherwise break the underlying cryptography. I.e., we
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perform reduction proofs against the security definitions of the primitives. For sig-
nature forgeries and collisions of nonces or ciphertexts, these are relatively straight-
forward proofs. For the fact that the adversary cannot guess “official” nonces as
well as additional randomizers in signatures and ciphertext, we use the information-
flow invariant on the variables of CˆH to show that the adversary has no partial in-
formation about such values in situations where correct guessing would put the run
in an error set. This proves that MH is computationally at least as secure as the ideal
system (Step 5 in Figure 4).
Finally, simulatability is transitive [17]. Hence the original real system is also as secure
as the ideal system (Step 6 in Figure 4).
6 The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol
The original Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol and Lowe’s variant consist of
seven steps. Four steps deal with key generation and public-key distribution. They are
usually omitted in a security analysis, and it is simply assumed that keys have already
been generated and distributed. We do this as well to keep the proof short. However,
the underlying cryptographic library offers commands for modeling these steps as well.
The main part of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol consists of the
following three steps, expressed in the typical protocol notation, as in, e.g., [33].
1. u→ v : Epkv (Nu, u)
2. v → u : Epku (Nu, Nv, v)
3. u→ v : Epkv (Nv).
Here, user u seeks to establish a session with user v. He generates a nonceNu and sends
it to v together with his identity, encrypted with v’s public key (first message). Upon
receiving this message, v decrypts it to obtain the nonce Nu. Then v generates a new
nonce Nv and sends both nonces and her identity back to u, encrypted with u’s public
key (second message). Upon receiving this message, u decrypts it and tests whether the
contained identity v equals the sender of the message and whether u earlier sent the first
contained nonce to user v. If yes, u sends the second nonce back to v, encrypted with
v’s public key (third message). Finally, v decrypts this message; and if v had earlier
sent the contained nonce to u, then v believes to speak with u.
7 The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol Using the
Dolev-Yao-style Cryptographic Library
Almost all formal proof techniques for protocols such as Needham-Schroeder-Lowe
first need a reformulation of the protocol into a more detailed version than the three
steps above. These details include necessary tests on received messages, the types and
generation rules for values like u and Nu, and a surrounding framework specifying the
number of participants, the possibilities of multiple protocol runs, and the adversary
capabilities. The same is true when using the Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library
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from [1], i.e., it plays a similar role in our proof as “the CSP Dolev-Yao model” or “the
inductive-approach Dolev-Yao model” in other proofs. Our protocol formulation in this
framework is given in Algorithms 1 and 2.4 We first explain this formulation, and then
consider general aspects of the surrounding framework as far as needed in our proofs.
7.1 Detailed Protocol Descriptions
Recall that the underlying framework is automata-based, i.e., protocols are executed by
interacting machines, and event-based, i.e., machines react on received inputs. By MNSi
we denote the Needham-Schroeder machine for a participant i; it can act in the roles of
both u and v above.
The first type of input that MNSi can receive is a start message (new prot, v) from
its user denoting that it should start a protocol run with user v. The number of users
is called n. User inputs are distinguished from network inputs by arriving at a port
EA inu?. The “EA” stands for entity authentication because the user interface is the
same for all entity authentication protocols. The reaction on this input, i.e., the sending
of the first message, is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Evaluation of User Inputs in MNSu
Input: (new prot, v) at EA inu? with v ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u}.
1: nhndu ← gen nonce().
2: Nonceu,v := Nonceu,v ∪ {nhndu }.
3: uhnd ← store(u).
4: lhnd1 ← list(nhndu , uhnd).
5: chnd1 ← encrypt(pkehndv,u, lhnd1 ).
6: mhnd1 ← list(chnd1 ).
7: send i(v,mhnd1 ).
The command gen nonce generates the nonce. MNSu adds the result nhndu to a set
Nonceu,v for future comparison. The command store inputs arbitrary application data
into the cryptographic library, here the user identity u. The command list forms a list and
encrypt is encryption. The final command send i means that MNSu attempts to send the
resulting term to v over an insecure channel. The list operation directly before sending
is a technicality: recall that only lists are allowed to be sent in this library because the
list operation concentrates verifications that no secret items are put into messages.
The behavior of the Needham-Schroeder machine of participant u upon receiving a
network input is defined similarly in Algorithm 2. The input arrives at port outu? and is
of the form (v, u, i,mhnd) where v is the supposed sender, i denotes that the channel is
insecure, andmhnd is a handle to a list. The port outu? is connected to the cryptographic
library, whose two implementations represent the obtained Dolev-Yao-style term or real
bitstring, respectively, to the protocol in a unified way by a handle.
4 For some frameworks there are compilers to generate these detailed protocol descriptions, e.g.,
[88]. This should be possible for this framework in a similar way.
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Algorithm 2 Evaluation of Network Inputs in MNSu
Input: (v, u, i, mhnd) at outu? with v ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {u}.
1: chnd ← list proj(mhnd, 1)
2: lhnd ← decrypt(skehndu , chnd)
3: xhndi ← list proj(lhnd, i) for i = 1, 2, 3.
4: if xhnd1 6= ↓ ∧ xhnd2 6= ↓ ∧ xhnd3 = ↓ then {First Message is input}
5: x2 ← retrieve(xhnd2 ).
6: if x2 6= v then
7: Abort
8: end if
9: nhndu ← gen nonce().
10: Nonceu,v := Nonceu,v ∪ {nhndu }.
11: uhnd ← store(u).
12: lhnd2 ← list(xhnd1 , nhndu , uhnd).
13: chnd2 ← encrypt(pkehndv,u, lhnd2 ).
14: mhnd2 ← list(chnd2 ).
15: send i(v,mhnd2 ).
16: else if xhnd1 6= ↓ ∧ xhnd2 6= ↓ ∧ xhnd3 6= ↓ then {Second Message is input}
17: x3 ← retrieve(xhnd3 ).
18: if x3 6= v ∨ xhnd1 6∈ Nonceu,v then
19: Abort
20: end if
21: lhnd3 ← list(xhnd2 ).
22: chnd3 ← encrypt(pkehndv,u, lhnd3 ).
23: mhnd3 ← list(chnd3 ).
24: send i(v,mhnd3 ).
25: else if xhnd1 ∈ Nonceu,v ∧ xhnd2 = xhnd3 = ↓ then {Third Message is input}
26: Output (ok, v) at EA outu !.
27: end if
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In this algorithm, the protocol machine first decrypts the list content using its secret
key; this yields a handle lhnd to an inner list. This list is parsed into at most three
components using the command list proj. If the list has two elements, i.e., it could
correspond to the first message of the protocol, and if it contains the correct identity,
the machine generates a new nonce and stores its handle in the set Nonceu,v. Then it
builds up a new list according to the protocol description, encrypts it and sends it to
user v. If the list has three elements, i.e., it could correspond to the second message
of the protocol, the machine tests whether the third list element equals v and the first
list element is contained in the set Nonceu,v. If one of these tests does not succeed,
MNSu aborts. Otherwise, it again builds up a term according to the protocol description
and sends it to user v. Finally, if the list has only one element, i.e., it could correspond
to the third message of the protocol, the machine tests if the handle of this element is
contained in Nonceu,v. If so, MNSu outputs (ok, v) at EA outu !. This signals to user u
that the protocol with user v has terminated successfully, i.e., u believes to speak with
v.
Both algorithms should immediately abort the handling of the current input if a
cryptographic command does not yield the desired result, e.g., if a decryption fails.
For readability we omitted this in the algorithm descriptions; instead we impose the
following convention on both algorithms.
Convention 1 If MNSu receives ↓ as the answer of the cryptographic library to a com-
mand, then MNSu aborts the execution of the current algorithm, except for the command
types list proj or send i.
We refer to Step i of Algorithm j as Step j.i.
7.2 Overall Framework and Adversary Model
When protocol machines such as MNSu for certain users u ∈ {1, . . . , n} are defined,
there is no guarantee that all these machines are correct. A trust model determines for
what subsets H of {1, . . . , n} we want to guarantee anything; in our case this is es-
sentially for all subsets: We aim at entity authentication between u and v whenever
u, v ∈ H and thus whenever MNSu and MNSv are correct. Incorrect machines disappear
and are replaced by the adversary. Each set of potential correct machines together with
its user interface constitute a structure, and the set of these structures is called the sys-
tem, cf. Section 2.2. Recall further that when considering the security of a structure,
an arbitrary probabilistic machine H is connected to the user interface to represent all
users, and an arbitrary machine A is connected to the remaining free ports (typically the
network) and to H to represent the adversary, see Fig. 5. In polynomial-time security
proofs, H and A are polynomial-time.
This setting implies that any number of concurrent protocol runs with both honest
participants and the adversary are considered because H and A can arbitrarily interleave
protocol start inputs (new prot, v) with the delivery of network messages.
For a set H of honest participants, the user interface of the ideal and real cryp-
tographic library is the port set S cryH := {inu?, outu ! | u ∈ H}. This is where the
Needham-Schroeder machines input their cryptographic commands and obtain results
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Fig. 5. Overview of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Ideal System
and received messages. In the ideal case this interface is served by just one machine
THH called trusted host which essentially administrates Dolev-Yao-style terms un-
der the handles. In the real case, the same interface is served by a set Mˆ cryH :=
{Mcryu,H | u ∈ H} of real cryptographic machines. The corresponding systems are called
Syscry,id := {({THH}, S
cry
H ) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}} and Sys
cry,real := {(Mˆ cryH , S
cry
H ) | H ⊆
{1, . . . , n}}.
The user interface of the Needham-Schroeder machines or any other entity authenti-
cation protocol is SEAH := {EA inu?,EA outu ! | u ∈ H}. The ideal and real Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe systems serving this interface differ only in the cryptographic library.
With Mˆ NSH := {MNSu | u ∈ H}, they are Sys
NS,id := {(Mˆ NSH ∪ {THH}, S
EA
H ) | H ⊆
{1, . . . , n}} and SysNS,real := {(Mˆ NSH ∪ Mˆ
cry
H , S
EA
H ) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}}.
7.3 Initial State
We have assumed in the algorithms that each Needham-Schroeder machine MNSu al-
ready has a handle skehndu to its own secret encryption key and handles pke
hnd
v,u to the
corresponding public keys of every participant v. The cryptographic library can also
represent key generation and distribution by normal commands. Formally, this assump-
tion means that for each participant u two entries of the following form are added to D
where H = {u1, . . . , um}:
(skeu , type := ske, arg := (), hndu := ske
hnd
u , len := 0);
(pkeu , type := pke, arg := (), hndu1 := pke
hnd
u,u1
, . . . ,
hndum := pke
hnd
u,um
, hnda := pke
hnd
u,a , len := pke len
∗(k)).
Here skeu and pkeu are two consecutive natural numbers and pke len∗ is the length
function for public keys. Treating the secret key length as 0 is a technicality in [1] and
will not matter here. Further, each machine MNSu contains the bitstring u denoting its
identity, and the family (Nonceu,v)v∈{1,...,n} of initially empty sets of (nonce) handles.
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7.4 On Polynomial Runtime
In order to be valid users of the real cryptographic library, the machines MNSu have
to be polynomial-time. We therefore define that each machine MNSu maintains explicit
polynomial bounds on the accepted message lengths and the number of inputs accepted
at each port. As this is done exactly as in the cryptographic library, we omit the rigorous
write-up.
8 The Security Property
Our security property states that an honest participant v only successfully terminates a
protocol with an honest participant u if u has indeed started a protocol with v, i.e., an
output (ok, u) at EA outv ! can only happen if there was a prior input (new prot, v) at
EA inu?. This property and also the actual protocol does not consider replay attacks,
i.e., a user v could successfully terminate a protocol with u multiple times while u
started a protocol with v only once. However, this can easily be avoided as follows: If
MNSu receives a message from v containing one of its own nonces, it additionally re-
moves this nonce from the corresponding set, i.e., it removes xhnd1 from Nonceu,v after
Steps 2.20 and 2.25. Proving freshness given this change and mutual authentication is
useful future work, but better done once the proof has been automated. Warinschi proves
these properties [75]. The even stronger property of matching conversations from [9]
that he also proves makes constraints on events within the system, not only at the inter-
face. We thus regard it as an overspecification in an approach based on abstraction.
Integrity properties in the underlying model are formally sets of traces at the user
interfaces of a system, i.e., here at the port sets SEAH . Intuitively, an integrity property
Req contains the “good” traces at these ports. A trace is a sequence of sets of events.
We write an event p?m or p!m, meaning that message m occurs at in- or output port
p. The t-th step of a trace r is written rt; we speak of the step at time t. The integrity
requirement ReqEA for the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol is defined as follows,
meaning that if v believes to speak with u at time t1, then there exists a past time t0
where u started a protocol with v:
Definition 3. (Entity Authentication Requirement) A trace r is contained in ReqEA if
for all u, v ∈ H:
∀t1 ∈ N : EA outv !(ok, u) ∈ rt1
⇒ ∃t0 < t1 : EA inu?(new prot, v) ∈ rt0 .
✸
The notion of a system Sys fulfilling an integrity property Req essentially comes in
two flavors [59]. Perfect fulfillment, Sys |=perf Req , means that the integrity property
holds for all traces arising in runs of Sys (a well-defined notion from the underlying
model [17]). Computational fulfillment, Sys |=poly Req, means that the property only
holds for polynomially bounded users and adversaries, and that a negligible error prob-
ability is permitted. Perfect fulfillment implies computational fulfillment.
The following theorem captures the security of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe pro-
tocol; we prove it in the rest of the paper.
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Theorem 2. (Security of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe Protocol) For the Needham-
Schroeder-Lowe systems from Section 7.2 and the integrity property of Definition 3, we
have SysNS,id |=perf ReqEA and SysNS,real |=poly ReqEA. ✷
9 Proof of the Cryptographic Realization from the Idealization
As discussed in the introduction, the idea of our approach is to prove Theorem 2 for
the protocol using the ideal Dolev-Yao-style cryptographic library. Then the result for
the real system follows automatically. As this paper is the first instantiation of this
argument, we describe it in detail.
The notion that a system Sys1 securely implements another system Sys2 reactive
simulatability (recall the introduction), is written Sys1 ≥polysec Sys2 (in the computational
case). The main result of [1] is therefore
Syscry,real ≥polysec Sys
cry,id. (1)
Since SysNS,real and SysNS,id are compositions of the same protocol with Syscry,real and
Syscry,id, respectively, the composition theorem of [17] and (1) imply
SysNS,real ≥polysec Sys
NS,id. (2)
Showing the theorem’s preconditions is easy since the machines MNSu are polynomial-
time (see Section 7.4). Finally, the integrity preservation theorem from [59] and (2)
imply for every integrity requirement Req that
(SysNS,id |=poly Req) ⇒ (SysNS,real |=poly Req). (3)
Hence if we prove SysNS,id |=perf ReqEA, we immediately obtain SysNS,real |=poly
ReqEA.
10 Proof in the Ideal Setting
This section contains the proof of the ideal part of Theorem 2: We prove that the
Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol implemented with the ideal, Dolev-Yao-style cryp-
tographic library perfectly fulfills the integrity requirement ReqEA. The proof idea is to
go backwards in the protocol step by step, and to show that a specific output always
requires a specific prior input. For instance, when user v successfully terminates a pro-
tocol with user u, then u has sent the third protocol message to v; thus v has sent the
second protocol message to u; and so on. The main challenge in this proof was to find
suitable invariants on the state of the ideal Needham-Schroeder-Lowe system.
We start by formulating the invariants and then prove the overall entity authentica-
tion requirement from the invariants. Finally we prove the invariants, after describing
detailed state transitions of the ideal cryptographic library as needed in that proof.
28
10.1 Invariants
This section contains invariants of the system SysNS,id, which are used in the proof of
Theorem 2. The first invariants, correct nonce owner and unique nonce use, are easily
proved and essentially state that handles contained in a set Nonceu,v indeed point to
entries of type nonce, and that no nonce is in two such sets. The next two invariants,
nonce secrecy and nonce-list secrecy, deal with the secrecy of certain terms. They are
mainly needed to prove the last invariant, correct list owner, which establishes who
created certain terms.
– Correct Nonce Owner. For all u ∈ H, v ∈ {1, . . . , n} and xhnd ∈ Nonceu,v, we
have D[hndu = xhnd].type = nonce.
– Unique Nonce Use. For all u, v ∈ H, all w,w′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and all j ≤ size: If
D[j].hndu ∈ Nonceu,w and D[j].hndv ∈ Noncev,w′ , then (u,w) = (v, w′).
Nonce secrecy states that the nonces exchanged between honest users u and v remain
secret from all other users and from the adversary, i.e., that the other users and the
adversary have no handles to such a nonce:
– Nonce Secrecy. For all u, v ∈ H and all j ≤ size: If D[j].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v then
D[j].hndw = ↓ for all w ∈ (H ∪ {a}) \ {u, v}.
Similarly, the invariant nonce-list secrecy states that a list containing such a nonce can
only be known to u and v. Further, it states that the identity fields in such lists are
correct for Needham-Schroeder-Lowe messages. Moreover, if such a list is an argument
of another entry, then this entry is an encryption with the public key of u or v.
– Nonce-List Secrecy. For all u, v ∈ H and all j ≤ size with D[j].type = list: Let
x indi := D[j].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3. If D[x indi ].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v then:
a) D[j].hndw = ↓ for all w ∈ (H ∪ {a}) \ {u, v}.
b) If D[x indi+1].type = data, then D[x indi+1].arg = (u).
c) For all k ≤ size we have j ∈ D[k].arg only if D[k].type = enc and
D[k].arg [1] ∈ {pkeu, pkev}.
The invariant correct list owner states that certain protocol messages can only be con-
structed by the “intended” users. For instance, if a database entry is structured like the
cleartext of a first protocol message, i.e., it is of type list, its first argument belongs to
the set Nonceu,v, and its second argument is non-cryptographic, i.e., of type data, then
it has been created by user u. Similar statements exist for the second and third protocol
message.
– Correct List Owner. For all u, v ∈ H and all j ≤ size with D[j].type = list: Let
x indi := D[j].arg [i] and xhndi,u := D[x indi ].hndu for i = 1, 2.
a) If xhnd1,u ∈ Nonceu,v and D[x ind2 ].type = data, then D[j] was created by MNSu
in Step 1.4.
b) If D[x ind1 ].type = nonce and xhnd2,u ∈ Nonceu,v, then D[j] was created by MNSu
in Step 2.12.
c) If xhnd1,u ∈ Nonceu,v and x ind2 = ↓, then D[j] was created by MNSv in Step 2.21.
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This invariant is key for proceeding backwards in the protocol. For instance, if v ter-
minates a protocol with user u, then v must have received a third protocol message.
Correct list owner implies that this message has been generated by u. Now u only con-
structs such a message if it received a second protocol message. Applying the invariant
two more times shows that u indeed started a protocol with v. The proof described be-
low will take care of the details. Formally, the invariance of the above statements is
captured in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The statements correct nonce owner, unique nonce use, nonce secrecy,
nonce-list secrecy, and correct list owner are invariants of SysNS,id, i.e., they hold at all
times in all runs of {MNSu | u ∈ H} ∪ {THH} for all H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. ✷
The proof is postponed to Section 10.4.
10.2 Entity Authentication Proof
To increase readability, we partition the proof into several steps with explanations in
between. Assume that u, v ∈ H and that MNSv outputs (ok, u) to its user, i.e., a protocol
between u and v has terminated successfully. We first show that this implies that MNSv
has received a message corresponding to the third protocol step, i.e., of the form that
allows us to apply correct list owner to show that it was created by MNSv . The following
property of THH proven in [1] will be useful in this proof to show that properties proven
for one time also hold at another time.
Lemma 2. In the ideal cryptographic library Syscry,id, the only modifications to exist-
ing entries x inD are assignments to previously undefined attributes x.hndu (except for
counter updates in entries for signature keys, which we do not have to consider here).
✷
Proof. (Ideal part of Theorem 2) Assume that MNSv outputs (ok, u) at EA outv ! for
u, v ∈ H at time t4. By definition of Algorithms 1 and 2, this can only happen if there
was an input (u, v, i,m3 hndv ) at outv? at a time t3 < t4. Here and in the sequel we use the
notation of Algorithm 2, but we distinguish the variables from its different executions
by a superscript indicating the number of the (claimed) received protocol message, here
3
, and give handles an additional subscript for their owner, here v.
The execution of Algorithm 2 for this input must have given l3 hndv 6= ↓ in Step
2.2, since it would otherwise abort by Convention 1 without creating an output. Let
l3
ind
:= D[hndv = l
3 hnd
v ].ind . The algorithm further implies D[l3
ind
].type = list. Let
x3i
ind
:= D[l3
ind
].arg[i] for i = 1, 2 at the time of Step 2.3. By definition of list proj
and since the condition of Step 2.25 is true immediately after Step 2.3, we have
x3
hnd
1,v = D[x
3
1
ind
].hndv at time t4 (4)
and
x3
hnd
1,v ∈ Noncev,u ∧ x
3
2
ind
= ↓ at time t4, (5)
since x3 hnd2,v = ↓ after Step 2.3 implies x32
ind
= ↓.
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This first part of the proof shows that MNSv has received a list corresponding to a third
protocol message. Now we apply correct list owner to the list entry D[l3ind] to show
that this entry was created by MNSu . Then we show that MNSu only generates such an
entry if it has received a second protocol message. To show that this message contains
a nonce from v, as needed for the next application of correct list owner, we exploit the
fact that v accepts the same value as its nonce in the third message, which we know
from the first part of the proof.
Proof (cont’d with 3rd message). Equations (4) and (5) are the preconditions for Part
c) of correct list owner. Hence the entry D[l3ind] was created by MNSu in Step 2.21.
This algorithm execution must have started with an input (w, u, i,m2 hndu ) at outu?
at a time t2 < t3 with w 6= u. As above, we conclude l2
hnd
u 6= ↓ in Step 2.2, set l2
ind
:=
D[hndu = l
2 hnd
u ].ind , and obtain D[l2
ind
].type = list. Let x2i
ind
:= D[l2
ind
].arg [i] for
i = 1, 2, 3 at the time of Step 2.3. As the condition of Step 2.16 is true immediately af-
terwards, we obtain x2 hndi,u 6= ↓ for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The definition of list proj and Lemma 2
imply
x2
hnd
i,u = D[x
2
i
ind
].hndu for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} at time t4. (6)
Step 2.18 ensures x23 = w and x2
hnd
1,u ∈ Nonceu,w. Thus correct nonce owner implies
D[x21
ind
].type = nonce. (7)
Now we exploit that MNSu creates the entry D[l3
ind
] in Step 2.21 with the input
list(x2
hnd
2,u ). With the definitions of list and list proj this implies x22
ind
= x31
ind
. Thus
Equations (4) and (5) imply
D[x22
ind
].hndv ∈ Noncev,u at time t4. (8)
We have now shown that MNSu has received a list corresponding to the second protocol
message. We apply correct list owner to show that MNSv created this list, and again we
can show that this can only happen if MNSv received a suitable first protocol message.
Further, the next part of the proof shows that w = v and thus MNSu got the second
protocol message from MNSv , which remained open in the previous proof part.
Proof (cont’d with 2nd message). Equations (6) to (8) are the preconditions for Part b)
of correct list owner. Thus the entry D[l2ind] was created by MNSv in Step 2.12. The
construction of this entry in Steps 2.11 and 2.12 implies x23 = v and hence w = v
(using the definitions of store and retrieve, and list and list proj). With the results from
before Equation (7) and Lemma 2 we therefore obtain
x23 = v ∧ x
2 hnd
1,u ∈ Nonceu,v at time t4. (9)
The algorithm execution where MNSv creates the entry D[l2
ind
] must have started
with an input (w′, v, i,m1 hndv ) at outv? at a time t1 < t2 with w′ 6= v. As above,
we conclude l1 hndv 6= ↓ in Step 2.2, set l1
ind
:= D[hndv = l
1 hnd
v ].ind , and obtain
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D[l1
ind
].type = list. Let x1i
ind
:= D[l1
ind
].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3 at the time of Step
2.3. As the condition of Step 2.4 is true, we obtain x1 hndi,v 6= ↓ for i ∈ {1, 2}. Then the
definition of list proj and Lemma 2 yield
x1
hnd
i,v = D[x
1
i
ind
].hndv for i ∈ {1, 2} at time t4. (10)
When MNSv creates the entry D[l2
ind
] in Step 2.12, its input is list(x1 hnd1,v , nhndv , vhnd).
This implies x11
ind
= x21
ind (as above). Thus Equations (6) and (9) imply
D[x11
ind
].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v at time t4. (11)
The test in Step 2.6 ensures that x12 = w′ 6= ↓. This implies D[x12
ind
].type = data by
the definition of retrieve, and therefore with Lemma 2,
D[x12
ind
].type = data at time t4. (12)
We finally apply correct list owner again to show that MNSu has generated this list cor-
responding to a first protocol message. We then show that this message must have been
intended for user v, and thus user u has indeed started a protocol with user v.
Proof. (cont’d with 1st message) Equations (10) to (12) are the preconditions for Part
a) of correct list owner. Thus the entry D[l1ind] was created by MNSu in Step 1.4. The
construction of this entry in Steps 1.3 and 1.4 implies x12 = u and hence w′ = u.
The execution of Algorithm 1 must have started with an input (new prot, w′′) at
EA inu? at a time t0 < t1. We have to show w′′ = v. When MNSu creates the entry
D[l1
ind
] in Step 1.4, its input is list(nhndu , uhnd) with nhndu 6= ↓. Hence the definition of
list proj implies D[x11
ind
].hndu = n
hnd
u ∈ Nonceu,w′′ . With Equation (11) and unique
nonce use we conclude w′′ = v.
In a nutshell, we have shown that for all times t4 where MNSv outputs (ok, u) at
EA outv !, there exists a time t0 < t4 such that MNSu receives an input (new prot, v) at
EA inu? at time t0. This proves Theorem 2.
10.3 Command Evaluation by the Ideal Cryptographic Library
This section contains the definition of the cryptographic commands used for modeling
the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, and the local adversary commands that model
the extended capabilities of the adversary as far as needed to prove the invariants. Recall
that we deal with top levels of Dolev-Yao-style terms, and that commands typically
create a new term with its index, type, arguments, handles, and length functions, or
parse an existing term. We present the full definitions of the commands, but the reader
can ignore the length functions, which have names x len. Note that we already defined
the commands for generating a nonce and for public-key encryption in Section 3.2,
hence we do not repeat them here.
Each input c at a port inu? with u ∈ H ∪ {a} should be a list (cmd , x1, . . . , xj)
with cmd from a fixed list of commands and certain parameter domains. We usually
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write it y ← cmd(x1, . . . , xj) with a variable y designating the result that THH returns
at outu !. The algorithm ihnd := ind2hndu(i) (with side effect) denotes that THH de-
termines a handle ihnd for user u to an entry D[i]: If ihnd := D[i].hndu 6= ↓, it returns
that, else it sets and returns ihnd := D[i].hndu := curhndu++. On non-handles, it is
the identity function. The function ind2hnd∗u applies ind2hndu to each element of a list.
In the following definitions, we assume that a cryptographic command is input at
port inu? with u ∈ H∪{a}. First, we describe the commands for storing and retrieving
data via handles.
– Storing: mhnd ← store(m), for m ∈ {0, 1}max len(k).
If i := D[type = data ∧ arg = (m)].ind 6= ↓ then return mhnd :=
ind2hndu(i). Otherwise if data len∗(len(m)) > max len(k) return ↓. Else set
mhnd := curhndu++ and
D :⇐ (ind := size++, type := data, arg := (m),
hndu := m
hnd, len := data len∗(len(m))).
– Retrieval: m← retrieve(mhnd).
m := D[hndu = m
hnd ∧ type = data].arg [1].
Next we describe list creation and projection. Lists cannot include secret keys of the
public-key systems (entries of type ske, sks) because no information about those must
be given away.
– Generate a list: lhnd ← list(xhnd1 , . . . , xhndj ), for 0 ≤ j ≤ max len(k).
Let xi := D[hndu = xhndi ].ind for i = 1, . . . , j. If any D[xi].type ∈ {sks, ske},
set lhnd := ↓.If l := D[type = list ∧ arg = (x1, . . . , xj)].ind 6= ↓, then return
lhnd := ind2hndu(l). Otherwise, set length := list len∗(D[x1].len , . . . , D[xj ].len)
and return ↓ if length > max len(k). Else set lhnd := curhndu++ and
D :⇐ (ind := size++, type := list, arg := (x1, . . . ,
xj), hndu := l
hnd, len := length).
– i-th projection: xhnd ← list proj(lhnd, i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ max len(k).
If D[hndu = lhnd ∧ type = list].arg = (x1, . . . , xj) with j ≥ i, then xhnd :=
ind2hndu(xi), otherwise xhnd := ↓.
Further, we used a command for decrypting a list.
– Decryption: lhnd ← decrypt(skhnd, chnd).
Let sk := D[hndu = skhnd ∧ type = ske].ind and c := D[hndu = chnd ∧
type = enc].ind . Return ↓ if c = ↓ or sk = ↓ or pk := D[c].arg [1] 6= sk + 1 or
l := D[c].arg [2] = ↓. Else return lhnd := ind2hndu(l).
From the set of local adversary commands, which capture additional commands
for the adversary at port ina?, we only describe the command adv parse. It allows the
adversary to retrieve all information that we do not explicitly require to be hidden.
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This command returns the type and usually all the abstract arguments of a value (with
indices replaced by handles), except in the case of ciphertexts. About the remaining
local adversary commands, we only need to know that they do not output handles to
already existing entries of type list or nonce.
– Parameter retrieval: (type, arg)← adv parse(mhnd).
Let m := D[hnda = mhnd].ind and type := D[m].type. In most cases, set
arg := ind2hnd∗a(D[m].arg). (Recall that this only transforms arguments in
INDS .) The only exception is for type = enc and D[m].arg of the form (pk , l) (a
valid ciphertext) and D[pk − 1].hnda = ↓ (the adversary does not know the secret
key); then arg := (ind2hnda(pk), D[l].len).
We finally describe the command that allows an adversary to send messages on
insecure channels. In the command, the adversary sends list l to v, pretending to be u.
– adv send i(u, v, lhnd), for u ∈ {1, . . . , n} and v ∈ H at port ina?.
Let l ind := D[hnd a = lhnd ∧ type = list].ind . If l ind 6= ↓, output
(u, v, i, ind2hndv(l
ind)) at outv !.
10.4 Proof of the Invariants
We start with the proof of correct nonce owner.
Proof (Correct nonce owner). Let xhnd ∈ Nonceu,v for u ∈ H and v ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By
construction, xhnd has been added to Nonceu,v by MNSu in Step 1.2 or Step 2.10. In both
cases, xhnd has been generated by the command gen nonce() at some time t, input at
port inu? of THH. Convention 1 implies xhnd 6= ↓, as MNSu would abort otherwise and
not add xhnd to the set Nonceu,v. The definition of gen nonce then implies D[hndu =
xhnd] 6= ↓ and D[hndu = xhnd].type = nonce at time t. Because of Lemma 2 this also
holds at all later times t′ > t, which finishes the proof.
The following proof of unique nonce use is quite similar.
Proof (Unique Nonce Use). Assume for contradiction that both D[j].hndu ∈
Nonceu,w and D[j].hndv ∈ Noncev,w′ at some time t. Without loss of generality,
let t be the first such time and let D[j].hndv 6∈ Noncev,w′ at time t − 1. By construc-
tion, D[j].hndv is thus added to Noncev,w′ at time t by Step 1.2 or Step 2.10. In both
cases, D[j].hndv has been generated by the command gen nonce() at time t − 1. The
definition of gen nonce implies that D[j] is a new entry and D[j].hndv its only handle
at time t − 1, and thus also at time t. With correct nonce owner this implies u = v.
Further, Noncev,w′ is the only set into which the new handle D[j].hndv is put at times
t− 1 and t. Thus also w = w′. This is a contradiction.
In the following, we prove correct list owner, nonce secrecy, and nonce-list secrecy
by induction. Hence we assume that all three invariants hold at a particular time t in a
run of the system, and show that they still hold at time t+ 1.
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Proof (Correct list owner). Let u, v ∈ H, j ≤ size with D[j].type = list. Let x indi :=
D[j].arg [i] and xhndi,u := D[x indi ].hndu for i = 1, 2 and assume that xhndi,u ∈ Nonceu,v
for i = 1 or i = 2 at time t+ 1.
The only possibilities to violate the invariant correct list owner are that (1) the entry
D[j] is created at time t+1 or that (2) the handleD[j].hndu is created at time t+1 for an
entry D[j] that already exists at time t or that (3) the handle xhndi,u is added to Nonceu,v
at time t + 1. In all other cases the invariant holds by the induction hypothesis and
Lemma 2.
We start with the third case. Assume that xhndi,u is added to Nonceu,v at time t + 1.
By construction, this only happens in a transition of MNSu in Step 1.2 and Step 2.10.
However, here the entry D[x indi ] has been generated by the command gen nonce input
at inu? at time t, hence x indi cannot be contained as an argument of an entry D[j] at time
t. Formally, this corresponds to the fact that D is well-formed, i.e., index arguments of
an entry are always smaller than the index of the entry itself; this has been shown in [1].
Since a transition of MNSu does not modify entries in THH, this also holds at time t+1.
For proving the remaining two cases, assume that D[j].hndu is created at time t+1
for an already existing entry D[j] or that D[j] is generated at time t+ 1. Because both
can only happen in a transition of THH, this implies xhndi,u ∈ Nonceu,v already at time t,
since transitions of THH cannot modify the set Nonceu,v. Because of u, v ∈ H, nonce
secrecy implies D[x indi ].hndw 6= ↓ only if w ∈ {u, v}. Lists can only be constructed
by the basic command list, which requires handles to all its elements. More precisely,
if w ∈ H ∪ {a} creates an entry D[j′] with D[j′].type = list and (x′1, . . . , x′k) :=
D[j].arg at time t+1 then D[x′i].hndw 6= ↓ for i = 1, . . . , k already at time t. Applied
to the entry D[j], this implies that either u or v have created the entry D[j].
We now only have to show that the entry D[j] has been created by u in the claimed
steps. This can easily be seen by inspection of Algorithms 1 and 2. We only show it in
detail for the first part of the invariant; it can be proven similarly for the remaining two
parts.
Let xhnd1,u ∈ Nonceu,v and D[x ind2 ].type = data. By inspection of Algorithms 1
and 2 and because D[j].type = list, we see that the entry D[j] must have been created
by either MNSu or MNSv in Step 1.4. (The remaining list generation commands either only
have one element, which implies x ind2 = ↓ and hence D[x ind2 ].type 6= data, or we have
D[x ind2 ].type = nonce by construction.) Now assume for contradiction that the entry
D[j] has been generated by MNSv . This implies that also the entry D[x ind1 ] has been
newly generated by the command gen nonce input at inv?. However, only MNSu can add
a handle to the set Nonceu,v (it is the local state of MNSu ), but every nonce that MNSu adds
to the set Nonceu,v is newly generated by the command gen nonce input by MNSu by
construction. This implies xhnd1,u 6∈ Nonceu,v at all times, which yields a contradiction
to xhnd1,u ∈ Nonceu,v at time t+ 1. Hence D[j] has been created by user u.
Proof (Nonce secrecy). Let u, v ∈ H, j ≤ size with D[j].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v , and
w ∈ (H ∪ {a}) \ {u, v} be given. Because of correct nonce owner, we know that
D[j].type = nonce. The invariant could only be affected if (1) the handle D[j].hndu is
put into the set Nonceu,v at time t+1 or (2) if a handle for w is added to the entry D[j]
at time t+ 1.
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For proving the first case, note that the set Nonceu,v is only extended by a handle
nhndu by MNSu in Steps 1.2 and 2.10. In both cases, nhndu has been generated by THH
at time t since the command gen nonce was input at inu? at time t. The definition of
gen nonce immediately implies that D[j].hndw = ↓ at time t if w 6= u. Moreover, this
also holds at time t + 1 since a transition of MNSu does not modify handles in THH,
which finishes the claim for this case.
For proving the second case, we only have to consider those commands that add
handles for w to entries of type nonce. These are only the commands list proj or
adv parse input at inw?, where adv parse has to be applied to an entry of type list,
since only entries of type list can have arguments which are indices to nonce entries.
More precisely, if one of the commands violated the invariant there would exist an entry
D[i] at time t such that D[i].type = list, D[i].hndw 6= ↓ and j ∈ (x ind1 , . . . , x indm ) :=
D[i].arg . However, both commands do not modify the set Nonceu,v, hence we have
D[j].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v already at time t. Now nonce secrecy yields D[j].hndw = ↓
at time t and hence also at all times < t because of Lemma 2. This implies that the
entry D[i] must have been created by either u or v, since generating a list presupposes
handles for all elements (cf. the previous proof). Assume without loss of generality that
D[i] has been generated by u. By inspection of Algorithms 1 and 2, this immediately
implies j ∈ (x ind1 , x ind2 ), since handles to nonces only occur as first or second element
in a list generation by u. Because of j ∈ D[i].arg[1, 2] and D[j].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v at
time t, nonce-list secrecy for the entry D[i] implies that D[i].hndw = ↓ at time t. This
yields a contradiction.
Proof (Nonce-list secrecy). Let u, v ∈ H, j ≤ size with D[j].type = list. Let x indi :=
D[j].arg [i] and xhndi,u := D[x indi ].hndu for i = 1, 2, and w ∈ (H ∪ {a}) \ {u, v}. Let
xhndi,u ∈ Nonceu,v for i = 1 or i = 2.
We first show that the invariant cannot be violated by adding the handle xhndi,u to
Nonceu,v at time t+1. This can only happen in a transition of MNSu in Step 1.2 or 2.10.
As shown in the proof of correct list owner, the entry D[x indi ] has been generated by
THH at time t. Since D is well-formed, this implies that x indi 6∈ D[j].arg for all entries
D[j] that already exist at time t. This also holds for all entries at time t + 1, since
the transition of MNSu does not modify entries of THH. This yields a contradiction to
x indi = D[j].arg [i]. Hence we now know that xhndi,u ∈ Nonceu,v already holds at time t.
Part a) of the invariant can only be affected if a handle for w is added to an entry
D[j] that already exists at time t. (Creation of D[j] at time t with a handle for w is
impossible as above because that presupposes handles to all arguments, in contradiction
to nonce secrecy.) The only commands that add new handles for w to existing entries
of type list are list proj, decrypt, adv parse, send i, and adv send i applied to an entry
D[k] with j ∈ D[k].arg . Nonce-list secrecy for the entry D[j] at time t then yields
D[k].type = enc. Thus the commands list proj, send i, and adv send i do not have
to be considered any further. Moreover, nonce-list secrecy also yields D[k].arg[1] ∈
{pkeu, pkev}. The secret keys of u and v are not known to w 6∈ {u, v}, formally
D[hndw = ske
hnd
u ] = D[hndw = ske
hnd
v ] = ↓; this corresponds to the invariant key
secrecy of [1]. Hence the command decrypt does not violate the invariant. Finally, the
command adv parse applied to an entry of type enc with unknown secret key also does
not give a handle to the cleartext list, i.e., to D[k].arg [2], but only outputs its length.
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Part b) of the invariant can only be affected if the list entry D[j] is created at time
t+ 1. (By well-formedness, the argument entry D[x indi+1] cannot be created after D[j].)
As in Part a), it can only be created by a party w ∈ {u, v} because other parties have no
handle to the nonce argument. Inspection of Algorithms 1 and 2 shows that this can only
happen in Steps 1.4 and 2.12, because all other commands list have only one argument,
while our preconditions imply x ind2 6= ↓.
– If the creation is in Step 1.4, the preceding Step 1.2 implies D[x ind1 ].hndw ∈
Noncew,w′ for some w′ and Step 1.3 implies D[x ind2 ].type = data. Thus the
preconditions of Part b) of the invariant can only hold for i = 1, and thus
D[x ind1 ].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v. Now unique nonce use implies u = w. Thus Steps
1.3 and 1.4 yield D[x ind2 ].arg = (u).
– If the creation is in Step 2.12, the preceding steps 2.10 and 2.11 imply that the pre-
conditions of Part b) of the invariant can only hold for i = 2. Then the precondition,
Step 2.10, and unique nonce use imply u = w. Finally, Steps 2.11 and 2.12 yield
D[x ind3 ].arg = (u).
Part c) of the invariant can only be violated if a new entry D[k] is created at time
t + 1 with j ∈ D[k].arg (by Lemma 2 and well-formedness). As D[j] already exists
at time t, nonce-list secrecy for D[j] implies D[j].hndw = ↓ for w 6∈ {u, v} at time
t. We can easily see by inspection of the commands that the new entry D[k] must
have been created by one of the commands list and encrypt (or by sign, which creates
a signature), since entries newly created by other commands cannot have arguments
that are indices of entries of type list. Since all these commands entered at a port inz ?
presuppose D[j].hndz 6= ↓, the entry D[k] is created by w ∈ {u, v} at time t + 1.
However, the only steps that can create an entry D[k] with j ∈ D[k].arg (with the
properties demanded for the entry D[j]) are Steps 1.5, 2.13, and 2.22. In all these cases,
we have D[k].type = enc. Further, we have D[k].arg[1] = pkew′ where w′ denotes
w’s current believed partner. We have to show that w′ ∈ {u, v}.
– Case 1: D[k] is created in Step 1.5. By inspection of Algorithm 1, we see that the
precondition of this proof can only be fulfilled for i = 1. Then D[x ind1 ].hndu ∈
Nonceu,v and D[x ind1 ].hndw ∈ Noncew,w′ and unique nonce use imply w′ = v.
– Case 2: D[k] is created in Step 2.13, and i = 2. Then D[x ind2 ].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v
and D[x ind2 ].hndw ∈ Noncew,w′ and unique nonce use imply w′ = v.
– Case 3: D[k] is created in Step 2.13, and i = 1. This execution of Algorithm 2
must give lhnd 6= ↓ in Step 2.2, since it would otherwise abort by Convention 1. Let
lind := D[hndw = l
hnd].ind . The algorithm further implies D[lind].type = list. Let
x0i
ind
:= D[lind].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3 at the time of Step 2.3, and let x0 hndi,w be the
handles obtained in Step 2.3. As the algorithm does not abort in Steps 2.5 and 2.7,
we have D[x02
ind
].type = data and D[x02
ind
].arg = (w′).
Further, the reuse of x0 hnd1,w in Step 2.12 implies x01
ind
= x ind1 . Together with the
precondition D[x ind1 ].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v , the entry D[lind] therefore fulfills the con-
ditions of Part b) of nonce-list secrecy with i = 1. This impliesD[x02 ind].arg = (u),
and thus w′ = u.
– Case 4: D[k] is created in Step 2.22. With Step 2.21, this implies x ind2 = ↓ and
thus i = 1. As in Case 3, this execution of Algorithm 2 must give lhnd 6= ↓ in
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Step 2.2, we set lind := D[hndw = lhnd].ind , and we have D[lind].type = list.
Let x0i
ind
:= D[lind].arg [i] for i = 1, 2, 3 at the time of Step 2.3, and let x0 hndi,w be
the handles obtained in Step 2.3. As the algorithm does not abort in Steps 2.17 and
2.19, we have D[x03
ind
].type = data and D[x03
ind
].arg = (w′).
Further, the reuse of x0 hnd2,w in Step 2.21 implies x02
ind
= x ind1 . Together with the
precondition D[x ind1 ].hndu ∈ Nonceu,v , the entry D[lind] therefore fulfills the con-
dition of Part b) of nonce-list secrecy with i = 2. This implies D[x03 ind].arg = (u),
and thus w′ = u.
Hence in all cases we obtained w′ = u, i.e., the list containing the nonce was indeed
encrypted with the key of an honest participant.
11 Conclusion
We have shown that an ideal cryptographic library, which constitutes a slightly extended
Dolev-Yao model, is sound with respect to the commonly accepted cryptographic def-
initions under arbitrary active attacks and in arbitrary protocol environments. The ab-
straction is deterministic and does not contain any cryptographic objects, hence it is
abstract in the sense needed for theorem provers. Sound means that we can implement
the abstraction securely in the cryptographic sense, so that properties proved for the ab-
straction carry over to the implementation without any further work. We provided one
possible implementation whose security is based on provably secure cryptographic sys-
tems. We already showed that the library can be extended in a modular way by adding
symmetric authentication [24] and symmetric encryption [25].
This soundness of the cryptographic library now allows for a meaningful analysis
of protocol properties on the abstract level. We demonstrated this with a proof of the
well-known Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key protocol. Further, the abstractness
of the library makes such an analysis accessible for formal verification techniques. As
many protocols commonly analyzed in the literature can be expressed with our library,
this enables the first formal, machine-aided verification of these protocols which is not
only meaningful for Dolev-Yao-like abstractions, but whose security guarantees are
equivalent to the security of the underlying cryptography. This bridges the up-to-now
missing link between cryptography and formal methods for arbitrary attacks.
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